| Geneva UpdateTrade Information Project
 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), Geneva
 May 20, 2003
  Coherence between World Bank, IMF and WTO: A Flawed                     Agenda for Development  Last week’s WTO General Council Meeting, May13, is                     seen as a “historic” event by the Secretariat                     because for the first time, the heads of the World Bank (WB),                     the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO met with                     the entire membership of the WTO. The Secretariats of these                     three institutions have been cooperating and exchanging information                     with each other for years, with scant attention from governments.                     However, this meeting is a clear signal from the three institutions                     to step up a more coordinated approach to expedite liberalization                     in developing countries and to bring development, trade and                     finance ministers to move “coherently” in that                     direction. In fact, the WTO secretariat background note suggests                     that governments grant observer status to these bodies at                     the highest level of negotiations i.e. the Trade Negotiating                     Committee (TNC) and its various negotiating bodies. This status                     has not been given to other UN bodies.  An analysis of the Secretariat’s background note,                     the public statements of the heads of all three institutions,                     the statements made by WTO Secretariat staff and developing                     country member states reveals the four following key concerns:                      All three institutions continue to press for faster and                       unequivocal liberalization citing liberalization as the                       primary solution for all problems related to economic decline,                       debt alleviation, poverty reduction and development even                       stretching as far as global security (See WTO Director General’s                       Speech). While the IMF offered a few caveats, saying liberalization                       needs to be properly sequenced, there continues to be a                       dearth of analysis on the long-term systemic problems created                       by liberalization of goods, services and capital. Furthermore,                       there is a failure to truly address negative impacts and                       policy reform outside the context of assistance to deal                       with these “temporary problems” and “external                       shocks.(1)” For instance, the WTO secretariat boasts                       about WTO rules acting as “shock absorbers”                       (2)during the Asian Financial crisis without analyzing the                       link between liberalization of capital controls and the                       crisis in the first place.Given this dogmatic insistence on liberalization for the                       sake of liberalization, the Secretariats are pushing for                       the concept of “credit” for developing countries                       in the WTO for having followed policy prescriptions of the                       Bank and Fund. By diverting attention to the idea of attaining                       “credit” in WTO horse-trading, both the Bank                       and the Fund hope to diffuse the tension surrounding their                       own past adjustment policies that have contributed, not                       only to balance of payments (BOP) problems, but a steady                       and progressive erosion of governmental institutions and                       social welfare programs--impacting the poorest in borrowing                       countries. The WTO also fails to mention that the concept                       of “credit” has resulted in empty negotiating                       time in the GATS negotiations with no real gains for developing                       countries For years, WTO delegates from developing countries have talked                     about being squeezed on two fronts. At the national level,                     they have been forced to liberalize through structural adjustment                     policies of the Bank and the Fund. At the international level,                     their negotiating positions are eroded by what they have already                     given away nationally. Conveniently termed “autonomous                     liberalization,” the idea of credit is riddled with                     problems. 1) Countries often did not liberalize on their own                     terms. 2) It is unclear what they can gain out of “credit”                     in the WTO.  Developing countries have been interested in the concept                     of “credit” in the WTO in order to decrease pressure                     on them to make ambitious concessions in WTO negotiations.                     They hoped that by acknowledging unilateral liberalization,                     developed country members would grant them some breathing                     space in negotiations or make further concessions in return.                     Most recently, members agreed to the modalities/guidelines                     for credit in the Services talks. The Services modalities                     for “credit”are falsely publicized as a success                     in the WTO because all insiders and, in particular, Services                     negotiators, know that after over a year of fighting over                     modalities—credit has been left to bilateral negotiating                     among drastically unequal economic powers. According to the                     Services modalities on credit, even developed countries can                     ask for credit from their developing country partners. Moreover,                     these guidelines encourage countries to bind liberalization                     in the WTO that members undertook unilaterally in exchange                     for credit in that particular area . Thus more than any tangible                     benefits of “credit” in the GATS negotiations,                     the concept legitimized controversial economic reforms prescribed                     by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Moreover, the offer of                     “credit” encourages developing countries to bind                     these controversial reforms within the WTO in exchange for                     ambiguous gains.                      Another issue of relevance is Special and Differential                       Treatment (S&D). Though currently heavily contested                       in the Doha Round, the WB is positioning itself to be the                       “knowledge Bank” regarding the concept of Special                       and Differential Treatment. The WB’s analysis of S&D                       completely ignores the systemic imbalances in WTO agreements                       that have lead developing countries to see S&D, not                       as a special favor given to developing countries to delay                       liberalization, but as an obligation of economically powerful                       members to address the problems caused by liberalization.  The WTO and the World Bank believe S&D is similar to                     trade preferences and thereby “erodes” the welfare                     gains of liberalization and the concept of most favored nation.                     Both believe that S&D must be phased out over time. The                     WB concept, similar to the US and the EC position in the WTO,                     advocates for S&D for only least developed countries (LDCs)                     and small and vulnerable economies. This approach is not only                     divisive amongst developing country members and thereby weakens                     their collective negotiating position on this issue, but in                     actuality ignores the systemic problems of WTO rules for all                     developing countries. See also, “World Bank on SDT:                     Bad economics, worse politics, Claire Melamed, Christian Aid”                     at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/k34sdt.htm                     Perhaps the most troublesome feature of last week’s                       discussions are the way trade related technical assistance                       (TRTA) and Bank and Fund resources in general are                                               being used as a political tool in the WTO negotiations                           to push for greater and more ambitious commitments by                           developing countries; justifying the World Bank’s movement towards                           the narrow-minded prioritization of trade over other                           elements in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)                           and the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS); and,  positioning the IMF to work with the WTO as the “financier”                           to bail out developing countries once prescribed policies                           create negative impacts for their economies. The last point is particularly relevant for the proposed                     investment agreement in the WTO and the Services agreement’s                     investment clauses. Both the WTO and the IMF support trade,                     finance and capital account liberalization based on a purely                     theoretical economic analysis. Their analysis of the problem                     is limited to sequencing and “prudential regulation                     and financial sector reform ”(3). Their analysis does                     not factor in the effect of these policies given varying levels                     of development, industrialization, capacity and priorities                     among developing countries. This position is also rather ironic                     since the aggressiveness with which the main proponents of                     financial services (EC, US, Japan) are pushing for ambitious                     liberalization in the GATS nullifies any attempts to sequence                     or take time to reinforce or institute “prudential regulation”                     in this sector. Meanwhile, the IMF closely aligns itself with                     the proponents even though the investment negotiations remain                     contentious: “At the WTO, progress in the financial                     services talks and the possible negotiation of an international                     investment framework, can make a key contribution to international                     financial stability. The IMF’s mandate and ongoing work                     in this area suggests that close collaboration can be of significant                     mutual benefit…”(4)  The WTO Secretariat note says, “The IMF is committed                     to assisting countries that experience internal or external                     financial imbalances with advice and where warranted—financial                     support, including where the imbalances are related to the                     process of trade liberalization and reform.” (5) However,                     this view limits assistance to the symptom rather than the                     source of the problem.  Country Statements  For their part, developing countries addressed the heads                     of these institutions by cautioning them on their zealous                     promotion of liberalization. Morocco, on behalf of the Africa                     Group, and Bangladesh, on behalf of LDCs, expressed their                     concerns regarding the negative impacts of such policies.                     Gabon addressed its own problems with policy prescriptions                     of the IMF that limited the flexibilities accorded in the                     WTO. Kenya reinforced these concerns, noting how these policies                     have exacerbated “de-industrialisation, poverty and                     import surges.” Jamaica pointed to the historic and                     often contradictory advice of the Bretton Woods Institutions                     (BWIs) that in the 1980s, for instance, advised countries                     to move towards export processing zones for their economic                     development which then came underdisciplines of the WTO subsidies agreement. After spending                     scarce resources or loans based on the advice of the BWIs,                     members ask, how can countries be compensated for contradictory                     results in the WTO? Barbados and others addressed the problems                     created by losing tariff revenue due to trade liberalization                     and finding no alternative means to make up the lost revenue                     (6). Barbados also conveyed its dismay in the regular General                     Council following this meeting.
  Some delegates critiqued the limited view of the IMF in                     seeing the problems of liberalization as limited to BOP deficits.                     This view, some delegations felt, disregarded other long term                     problems associated with liberalization, such as unemployment,                     the inability of developing countries to renew domestic production                     once “inefficient” sectors were wiped out and                     the dismantling of social programs.  India: “My distinguished colleagues from Morocco and                     Bangladesh have already referred to the apprehensions felt                     by developing countries regarding the process of liberalisation                     and the end results. The Ambassador of Morocco referred to                     the negative implication of liberalization and the importance                     of addressing them through collective endeavour. The Ambassador                     of Bangladesh said that trade liberalization and globalisation                     have increased vulnerabilities of certain economies. He also                     pointed to the fact that the causal linkages between trade                     liberalization and growth are not clear—whether liberalization                     leads to growth or whether liberlisation is a process that                     autonomously takes place in the process of growth…We                     need to study problems objectively not dogmatically. This                     would ensure thatcoherence achieves its objective: that of development and                     poverty reduction on a global scale…”
  Conclusion  Technical Assistance, since Doha, has already gained political                     currency by proponents of ambitious WTO agreements while numerous                     outstanding issues remain unresolved in the WTO. This meeting                     of the IMF, WB and the WTO further reinforces the attitude                     that the problems are temporary, and that technical and financial                     assistance can solve them. All three institutions fell short                     of addressing the systemic problems created by such policies.                     Instead they focused on restricted market access of developing                     countries in agriculture and the general failure to liberalize.                     They propose that the Bank and the Fund can be effective in                     supporting the implementation of the Doha Round at the national                     level once the Round is completed. This scenario (where assistance                     is offered for ambitious commitments) can significantly weaken                     the negotiating positions of developing countries interested                     in systemic changes in the multilateral trading system towards                     pro-development rather than expressly “pro-liberalization”                     policies. And this is the likely scenario since both the Bank                     and the Fund’s messages have been about benefits of                     liberalization rather than actually tackling development concerns.  Trade-related technical assistance currently being delivered                     by these institutions has no mechanism of credible and independent                     assessment as to its effectiveness. The Integrated Framework                     (a project of six agencies with the Bank serving as the Secretariat)                     continues to be inconclusive and in its pilot phase even after                     a second start. Delegations’ personal comments regarding                     the increasingly ambitious training programs of the WTO indicate                     that the WTO attempts to bring delegates “through university                     in three days” leaving them more confused by tackling                     complex trade law and policy issues in a short amount of time.                     Complex issues regarding trade and competition, investment                     etc. are taught in an astonishingly short period without taking                     the time to establish a basic understanding of the principles                     and progressively moving through the various layers of complexity.                     Without an independent and anonymous mechanism for real feedback                     on the effectiveness of such assistance, it becomes difficult                     for the recipients to offer criticisms and suggestions for                     improvement.  Next Steps  The Director General of the WTO has asked the WTO membership                     to deliberate upon the “most appropriate institutional                     vehicle within the WTO for continuing our consultations with                     the IMF and the World Bank on priority areas for collaboration.”                     The DG and World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, have also                     recently signed a “six-month, renewable strategy for                     staff cooperation between the WTO and the World Bank.”                     Will there be language on “coherence” in a Cancun                     Declaration?  Both the Bank and the Fund are pushing to have observer                     status in the TNC and its subsidiary bodies. Members should                     ask themselves why these institutions rather than the UNDP                     and, in particular UNDP’s regional offices, are not                     proposed for such status instead--since the round is supposed                     to be about development. Moreover, what are the broader policy                     implications of “coherence” amongst these three                     bodies with regards to financing for development and the role                     of other UN bodies such as ECOSOC?  The Secretariat Background Note as a Useful Tool  The WTO background note prepared for the meeting of the                     three institutions is comprehensive and serves as a tremendous                     tool for civil society activists and governments to forge                     their own responses to the issues highlighted. The document                     can be found on the WTO website at www.docsonline.wto.org                     as WT/TF/COH/S/7 (see endnote 1). Some concerns have been                     raised above, but clearly much more coherent work can be done                     by civil society and their governments in responding to these                     issues.  The Trade Policy Review of individual countries has been                     highlighted as an informative tool for all three institutions                     in collaborating on policy coherence. Governments and civil                     society can use these country reports to assess the results                     of such policies on the poor and domestic stakeholders. It                     is a positive sign that the WTO document at least acknowledges                     that development policy begins at home and that prioritization                     of trade in the larger context of development also depends                     on member countries. However, while acknowledging this fact,                     the prescription towards liberalization and international                     trade are clearly promoted as the only solutions.  Some of these “themes” are also reiterated in                     the Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance. However, the                     rhetoric on liberalization continues with little research                     on the detrimental aspects of debt and the related weakening                     of terms of trade for developing countries. All of these issues                     demand urgent attention.____________________________________________________________
  Endnotes:                      Para 28, “Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking                       and Cooperation Between the WTO, the IMF, and the World                       Bank”, Note by Secretariat. ( WTO Document code: WT/TF/COH/S/7) Para. 38, Ibid. Para 10, Ibid. Horst Kohler, Managing Director of the IMF at WTO General                       Council, May 13, Geneva. Para 28, Ibid. SUNS #5344, “Trade: Coherence debate or IMF and                       World Bank monologues?,” Chakravarthi Raghavan.   |