| Focus on the Global South, July 27, 2004 In preparation for the World Trade Organization General Council                     Meeting on July 27-28, the Chairman has released a draft text                     as a basis for negotiations. This July framework, as it is                     called, is projected as a penultimate effort to bring the                     derailed organization back on track. As a closer inspection                     will show, however, this framework does nothing to address                     the demands of developing countries.  There is only one thing that developing country governments                     can do with he proposed July framework: dump it. The text                     is so unbalanced in favor of the interests of the trade superpowers                     that one wonders if these governments have been listening                     at all to the rising crescendo of protest from developing                     counties that culminated in the rebellion that resulted in                     the collapse of the Fifth Ministerial in Cancun in September                     of last year. The main reasons for rejecting this flawed text are the following:                      The Framework for Agriculture is simply an exercise to                       devise increasingly intricate mechanisms to accommodate                       the United States and European Union’s efforts to                       maintain the high levels of subsidization of their agricultural                       interests behind a smokescreen of vague promises to address                       the concerns of developing countries.The Framework for Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products                       (NAMA) simply reproduces a text rejected in Cancun by the                       developing countries since it amounts to nothing less than                       a prescription for their deindustrialization.The Framework on Trade Facilitation is nothing but a stubborn                       effort on the part of the trading powers to keep alive an                       issue that lacks the necessary explicit consensus of all                       members to be a subject of negotiation. Lip service is paid to the main concerns of developing                       countries, specifically, the cotton issue, special and differential                       treatment, development, and implementation, but they are                       actually treated as secondary issues the negotiation of                       which is consigned to future negotiations and left in the                       air. AGRICULTURE This text does not form the basis for rectifying distortions                     in agricultural trade. The EU and US provide between US$70-80                     billion each in domestic supports. This draft is the legal                     framework US and EU need for legitimizing the continuation                     of these supports. The key concerns of developed countries have been given the                     green light whilst developing countries concerns have not:                      An enlarged Blue Box for the US to house its 2002 Farm                       Bill payments;No limits or reductions on the Green Box which is the                       major culprit legitimizing dumping since for the US. Over                       $50 billion a year of supports (or 70% of US¹ domestic                       supports) are accounted for under this category. They are                       indirect export subsidies and should be treated as such.                       Essentially, cuts will be made to trade-distorting supports                       but these will be compensated through the Green and Blue                       boxes, i.e., this is a public relations box shuffling exercise.                     Sensitive products for the EU (or up 20% of their tariff                       lines) will be protected. In contrast, despite developing                       countries insistence over defending crops critical for food                       security and rural livelihoods, the text postpones dealing                       concretely with this issue.The pledge by the EU to eliminating export subsidies is                       also feeble since it is depends on others first fulfilling                       their commitments, e.g. US in export credits and food                       aid, and Canada as well as developing countries in “disciplining”                       their State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The deregulation                       of STEs, if applied also to developing countries STEs as                       the text implies, would be disastrous since STEs stabilize                       prices and food supply and play a critical role in ensuring                       food security. COTTON  The text will not provide what the West African cotton countries                     have been demanding: an end to subsidies in cotton. Moreover,                     contrary to their demand, the text treats cotton as part of                     the agriculture negotiations, thus undermining its satisfactory                     resolution. Promises to cap the product-specific supports US gives (to                     the tune of US$2.8 billion) is a futile exercise. Given the                     political weight of the US cotton lobby, US supports to cotton                     will simply re-emerge in the new Blue Box or the untouched                     Green Box. MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (NAMA) There is hardly any difference between the reject Derbez                     Text and the July package in this area, which means that developing                     countries should again reject its reincarnation as Annex B                     of the text. The language suggests that unbound tariff lines shall be                     subjected to non-linear approach, after they are bound at                     twice he applied rate. This would have very serious adverse                     implications for developing countries. Firstly, the applied                     rates have never been used as the basis for calculating tariff                     reductions. Secondly, the language of the text suggests that                     after negotiations, countries should bind all their unbound                     tariffs, which, again is a new addition to the modalities                     of negotiations.  The text directs that work continue on a non-linear formula                     applied on a line-by-line basis. This means that higher tariff                     rates would be subject to steeper tariff cuts. This kind of                     process of reduction of tariffs would drastically reduce the                     space for a number of developing industrializing countries                     to protect their small industries. The approach suggested in the July package for tariff reduction                     does not allow countries to choose their own rate, scope,                     pace and extent of future liberalization so as not to cause                     further adverse effects on local industries. Moreover it does                     not address problems that poor and developing countries will                     face from erosion of preferences. This package would never                     allow poor countries to build their supply capacity but would                     in fact lead to massive deindustrialization. All these features                     go against the demands being made by least developed countries                     on NAMA negotiating text since the Cancun Ministerial Conference                     of the WTO. SINGAPORE ISSUES In order to appease countries such as India and Malaysia,                     the July text says that negotiations on investment, competition                     and government procurement will not form part of the Work                     Program and goes ahead to mention that no work towards negotiations                     on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during                     the Doha Round. This is a deceptive formulation, for it does                     not mean that these issues are out of the WTO system, as the                     developing countries have demanded. They can be resurrected                     in some future round of negotiations.  In fact, the inclusion of trade facilitation in the July                     package as an item for negotiation is questionable since the                     Doha language clearly states that the explicit consensus of                     all members is necessary to begin negotiations on any of the                     Singapore issues. Moreover, the Doha language is also clear                     that if negotiations on any of the Singapore issues did not                     begin at the next Ministerial (i.e. at Cancun Ministerial                     Conference), then there would be no negotiations on any of                     these four issues. If this was the agreement and the July                     package brags about being accountable to the Doha Mandate                     then it has no right to include language that would suggest                     initiation on negotiations on trade facilitation. IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT This text, like the Doha Ministerial statement, trumpets                     its concern for developing countries by including S&D                     and some language on developmental concerns. The WTO however                     has to realize that people cannot be fooled by the same trick                     twice. The language is non-committal and at best can be described                     as vague. Importantly all the vague promises in the paragraphs                     associated with these issues, turn out to be wasted promises                     if the text within NAMA and agriculture negotiations gets                     implemented. Although new deadlines have been stated in the July package                     with respect to completion of the work of the Committee on                     Trade and Development,  the history of negotiations at                     the WTO is replete with examples, which show that deadlines                     are not honored when it comes to implementing decisions benefiting                     developing countries. SERVICES The services paragraph in Annex C is kept the least controversial                     in order to show that at least negotiations in this sector                     are on track. The truth is far from this. Countries are not                     coming forward to make offers to requests made. A number of                     developing countries do not see any reason for offering their                     service sectors as they are still grappling with existing                     problems and ambiguities in the GATS agreement. Their need                     for caution has been underscored by the April 2004 WTO dispute                     panel ruling against Mexico in the Telemex case where clauses                     in the GATS and auxiliary GATS annexes, that seemingly allowed                     developmental aspects of domestic regulations, were disregarded.                     In short, the services negotiations continue to be biased                     against developmental concerns.  IN CONCLUSION If there is one thing that links the July text, the Doha                     Ministerial Declaration, the defunct Ministerial Draft in                     Cancun, and the rejected Derbez text, it is this: all have                     been extremely unbalanced documents designed to protect and                     advance the interests of the trade superpowers at the expense                     of the developing countries. It is extremely hypocritical for World Trade Organization                     Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi to claim that the July                     text advances the “Doha Development Agenda”, since                     neither the Doha Ministerial Declaration nor the July text                     have anything to do with advancing development. The continuing intransigence of the trade superpowers and                     their determination to push their interests within the WTO                     framework shows how dysfunctional that framework has become                     as a mechanism for protecting, much less advancing, the economic                     interests and welfare of the developing world. The developing countries have waited for nearly ten years                     for the WTO to show some responsiveness to their needs. For                     this patience, they have been rewarded with a succession of                     anti-development proposals and programs culminating in the                     July text. Thus, it is important that they not only reject                     the July text but also move actively to find or create other                     mechanisms or frameworks to secure their interests outside                     the WTO. Development can no longer be pursued within a WTO paradigm. 
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